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Abstract
Adversarial attacks reveal important vulnera-
bilities and flaws of trained models. One po-
tent type of attack are universal adversarial
triggers, which are individual n-grams that,
when appended to instances of a class under
attack, can trick a model into predicting a tar-
get class. However, for inference tasks such
as fact checking, these triggers often inadver-
tently invert the meaning of instances they are
inserted in. In addition, such attacks produce
semantically nonsensical inputs, as they sim-
ply concatenate triggers to existing samples.
Here, we investigate how to generate adversar-
ial attacks against fact checking systems that
preserve the ground truth meaning and are se-
mantically valid. We extend the HotFlip attack
algorithm used for universal trigger genera-
tion by jointly minimizing the target class loss
of a fact checking model and the entailment
class loss of an auxiliary natural language in-
ference model. We then train a conditional
language model to generate semantically valid
statements, which include the found universal
triggers. We find that the generated attacks
maintain the directionality and semantic valid-
ity of the claim better than previous work.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Szegedy et al., 2013) are deceptive model inputs
designed to mislead an ML system into making
the wrong prediction. They expose regions of the
input space that are outside the training data distri-
bution where the model is unstable. It is important
to reveal such vulnerabilities and correct for them,
especially for tasks such as fact checking (FC).
In this paper, we explore the vulnerabilities of
FC models trained on the FEVER dataset (Thorne
et al., 2018), where the inference between a claim
and evidence text is predicted. We particularly
∗denotes equal contribution
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Figure 1: High level overview of our method. First,
universal triggers are discovered for flipping a source to
a target label (e.g. SUPPORTS → REFUTES). These
triggers are then used to condition the GPT-2 language
model to generate novel claims with the original label,
including at least one of the found triggers.
construct universal adversarial triggers (Wallace
et al., 2019) – single n-grams appended to the input
text that can shift the prediction of a model from
a source class to a target one. Such adversarial
examples are of particular concern, as they can
apply to a large number of input instances.
However, we find that the triggers also change
the meaning of the claim such that the true label
is in fact the target class. For example, when at-
tacking a claim-evidence pair with a ‘SUPPORTS’
label, a common unigram found to be a universal
trigger when switching the label to ‘REFUTES’ is
‘none’. Prepending this token to the claim drasti-
cally changes the meaning of the claim such that
the new claim is in fact a valid ‘REFUTES’ claim
as opposed to an adversarial ‘SUPPORTS’ claim.
Furthermore, we find adversarial examples con-
structed in this way to be nonsensical, as a new
token is simply being attached to an existing claim.
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Our contributions are as follows. We preserve
the meaning of the source text and improve the se-
mantic validity of universal adversarial triggers to
automatically construct more potent adversarial ex-
amples. This is accomplished via: 1) a novel exten-
sion to the HotFlip attack (Ebrahimi et al., 2018),
where we jointly minimize the target class loss of
a FC model and the attacked class loss of a natural
language inference model; 2) a conditional lan-
guage model trained using GPT-2 (Radford et al.,
2019), which takes trigger tokens and a piece of ev-
idence, and generates a semantically coherent new
claim containing at least one trigger. The resulting
triggers maintain potency against a FC model while
preserving the original claim label. Moreover, the
conditional language model produces semantically
coherent adversarial examples containing triggers,
on which a FC model performs 23.8% worse than
with the original FEVER claims. The code for the
paper is publicly available.1
2 Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples for NLP systems can be
constructed as automatically generated text (Ren
et al., 2019) or perturbations of existing input in-
stances (Jin et al.; Ebrahimi et al., 2018). For a de-
tailed literature overview, see Zhang et al. (2019).
One potent type of adversarial techniques are
universal adversarial attacks (Gao and Oates, 2019;
Wallace et al., 2019) – single perturbation changes
that can be applied to a large number of input in-
stances and that cause significant performance de-
creases of the model under attack. Wallace et al.
(2019) find universal adversarial triggers that can
change the prediction of the model using the Hot-
Flip algorithm (Ebrahimi et al., 2018).
However, for NLI tasks, they also change the
meaning of the instance they are appended to,
and the prediction of the model remains correct.
Michel et al. (2019) address this by exploring
only perturbed instances in the neighborhood of
the original one. Their approach is for instance-
dependent attacks, whereas we suggest finding uni-
versal adversarial triggers that also preserve the
original meaning of input instances. Another ap-
proach to this are rule-based perturbations of the
input (Ribeiro et al., 2018) or imposing adversar-
ial constraints on the produced perturbations (Dia
et al., 2019). By contrast, we extend the HotFlip
1https://github.com/copenlu/fever-adversarial-attacks
method by including an auxiliary Semantic Textual
Similarity (STS) objective. We additionally use the
extracted universal adversarial triggers to generate
adversarial examples with low perplexity.
2.2 Fact Checking
Fact checking systems consist of components to
identify check-worthy claims (Atanasova et al.,
2018; Hansen et al., 2019; Wright and Augenstein,
2020), retrieve and rank evidence documents (Yin
and Roth, 2018; Allein et al., 2020), determine
the relationship between claims and evidence doc-
uments (Bowman et al., 2015; Augenstein et al.,
2016; Baly et al., 2018), and finally predict the
claims’ veracity (Thorne et al., 2018; Augenstein
et al., 2019). As this is a relatively involved task,
models easily overfit to shallow textual patterns,
necessitating the need for adversarial examples to
evaluate the limits of their performance.
Thorne et al. (2019a) are the first to propose
hand-crafted adversarial attacks. They follow up on
this with the FEVER 2.0 task (Thorne et al., 2019b),
where participants design adversarial attacks for
existing FC systems. The first two winning sys-
tems (Niewinski et al., 2019) produce claims requir-
ing multi-hop reasoning, which has been shown
to be challenging for fact checking models (Os-
trowski et al., 2020). The other remaining sys-
tem (Kim and Allan, 2019) generates adversarial
attacks manually. We instead find universal adver-
sarial attacks that can be applied to most existing
inputs while markedly decreasing fact checking
performance. Niewinski et al. (2019) additionally
feed a pre-trained GPT-2 model with the target
label of the instance along with the text for con-
ditional adversarial claim generation. Conditional
language generation has also been employed by
Keskar et al. (2019) to control the style, content,
and the task-specific behavior of a Transformer.
3 Methods
3.1 Models
We take a RoBERTa (Liu et al., 2019) model pre-
trained with a LM objective and fine-tune it to clas-
sify claim-evidence pairs from the FEVER dataset
as SUPPORTS, REFUTES, and NOT ENOUGH
INFO (NEI). The evidence used is the gold evi-
dence, available for the SUPPORTS and REFUTES
classes. For NEI claims, we use the system of
Malon (2018) to retrieve evidence sentences. To
measure the semantic similarity between the claim
before and after prepending a trigger, we use a
large RoBERTa model fine-tuned on the Semantic
Textual Similarity Task.2 For further details, we
refer the reader to §A.1.
3.2 Universal Adversarial Triggers Method
The Universal Adversarial Triggers method is de-
veloped to find n-gram trigger tokens tα, which,
appended to the original input x, f(x) = y, cause
the model to predict a target class y˜ : f(tα, x) = y˜.
In our work, we generate unigram triggers, as gen-
erating longer triggers would require additional
objectives to later produce well-formed adversarial
claims. We start by initializing the triggers with
the token ‘a’. Then, we update the embeddings of
the initial trigger tokens eα with embeddings ewi
of candidate adversarial trigger tokens wi that min-
imize the loss L for the target class y˜. Following
the HotFlip algorithm, we reduce the brute-force
optimization problem using a first-order Taylor ap-
proximation around the initial trigger embeddings:
argmin
wi∈V
[ewi − eα]>∇eαL (1)
where V is the vocabulary of the RoBERTa model
and ∇eαL is the average gradient of the task loss
accumulated for all batches. This approximation
allows for a O(|V|) space complexity of the brute-
force candidate trigger search.
While HotFlip finds universal adversarial trig-
gers that successfully fool the model for many in-
stances, we find that the most potent triggers are of-
ten negation words, e.g., ‘not’, ‘neither’, ‘nowhere’.
Such triggers change the meaning of the text, mak-
ing the prediction of the target class correct. Ideally,
adversarial triggers would preserve the original la-
bel of the claim. To this end, we propose to include
an auxiliary STS model objective when searching
for candidate triggers. The additional objective is
used to minimize the loss L′ for the maximum sim-
ilarity score (5 out of 0) between the original claim
and the claim with the prepended trigger. Thus, we
arrive at the combined optimization problem:
argmin
wi∈V
([ewi − eα]>∇eαL+ [owi − oα]>∇oαL′) (2)
where ow is the STS model embedding of word w.
For the initial trigger token, we use “[MASK]” as
STS selects candidates from the neighborhood of
the initial token.
2https://huggingface.co/SparkBeyond/roberta-large-sts-b
3.3 Claim Generation
In addition to finding highly potent adversarial trig-
gers, it is also of interest to generate coherent state-
ments containing the triggers. To accomplish this,
we use the HuggingFace implementation of the
GPT-2 language model (Radford et al., 2019; Wolf
et al., 2019), a large transformer-based language
model trained on 40GB of text. The objective is
to generate a coherent claim, which either entails,
refutes, or is unrelated a given piece of evidence,
while also including trigger words.
The language model is first fine tuned on the
FEVER FC corpus with a specific input format.
FEVER consists of claims and evidence with the
labels SUPPORTS, REFUTES, or NOT ENOUGH
INFO (NEI). We first concatenate evidence and
claims with a special token. Next, to encourage gen-
eration of claims with certain tokens, a sequence
of tokens separated by commas is prepended to
the input. For training, the sequence consists of a
single token randomly selected from the original
claim, and four random tokens from the vocabu-
lary. This encourages the model to only select the
one token most likely to form a coherent and cor-
rect claim. The final input format is [trigger
tokens]||[evidence]||[claim]. Adversar-
ial claims are then generated by providing an initial
input of a series of five comma-separated trigger
tokens plus evidence, and progressively generating
the rest of the sequence. Subsequently, the set of
generated claims is pruned to include only those
which contain a trigger token, and constitute the
desired label. The latter is ensured by passing both
evidence and claim through an external NLI model
trained on SNLI (Bowman et al., 2015).
4 Results
We present results for universal adversarial trig-
ger generation and coherent claim generation. Re-
sults are measured using the original FC model on
claims with added triggers and generated claims
(macro F1). We also measure how well the added
triggers maintain the claim’s original label (seman-
tic similarity score), the perplexity (PPL) of the
claims with prepended triggers, and the semantic
quality of generated claims (manual annotation).
PPL is measured with a pretrained RoBERTa LM.
4.1 Adversarial Triggers
Table 1 presents the results of applying universal
adversarial triggers to claims from the source class.
The top-performing triggers for each direction are
found in §A.2. The adversarial method with a sin-
gle FC objective successfully deteriorates model
performance by a margin of 0.264 F1 score over-
all. The biggest performance decrease is when the
adversarial triggers are constructed to flip the pre-
dicted class from SUPPORTS to REFUTES. We
also find that 8 out of 18 triggers from the top-
3 triggers for each direction, are negation words
such as ‘nothing’, ‘nobody’, ‘neither’, ‘nowhere’
(see Table 4 in the appendix). The first of these
triggers decreases the performance of the model
to 0.014 in F1. While this is a significant perfor-
mance drop, these triggers also flip the meaning
of the text. The latter is again indicated by the de-
crease of the semantic similarity between the claim
before and after prepending a trigger token, which
is the largest for the SUPPORTS to REFUTES di-
rection. We hypothesise that the success of the best
performing triggers is partly due to the meaning of
the text being flipped.
Including the auxiliary STS objective increases
the similarity between the claim before and after
prepending the trigger for five out of six directions.
Moreover, we find that now only one out of the
18 top-3 triggers for each direction are negation
words. Intuitively, these adversarial triggers are
worse at fooling the FC model as they also have
to preserve the label of the original claim. No-
tably, for the SUPPORTS to REFUTES direction
the trigger performance is decreased with a mar-
gin of 0.642 compared to the single FC objective.
We conclude that including the STS objective for
generating Universal Adversarial triggers helps to
preserve semantic similarity with the original claim,
but also makes it harder to both find triggers pre-
serving the label of the claim while substantially
decreasing the performance of the model.
4.2 Generation
We use the method described in §3.3 to generate
156 claims using triggers found with the additional
STS objective, and 156 claims without. 52 claims
are generated for each class (26 flipping to one
class, 26 flipping to the other). A different GPT-2
model is trained to generate claims for each specific
class, with triggers specific to attacking that class
used as input. The generated claims are annotated
manually (see §B.3 for the procedure). The over-
all average claim quality is 4.48, indicating that
most generated statements are highly semantically
Class F1 STS PPL
No Triggers
All .866 5.139 11.92 (±45.92)
S .938 5.130 12.22 (±40.34)
R .846 5.139 12.14 (±37.70)
NEI .817 5.147 14.29 (±84.45)
FC Objective
All .602 (±.289) 4.586 (±.328) 12.96 (±55.37)
S→R .060 (±.034) 4.270 (±.295) 12.44 (±41.74)
S→NEI .611 (±.360) 4.502 (±.473) 12.75 (±40.50)
R→S .749 (±.027) 4.738 (±.052) 11.91 (±36.53)
R→NEI .715 (±.026) 4.795 (±.094) 11.77 (±36.98)
NEI→R .685 (±.030) 4.378 (±.232) 14.20 (±83.32)
NEI→S .793 (±.054) 4.832 (±.146) 14.72 (±93.15)
FC+STS Objectives
All .763 (±.123) 4.786 (±.156) 12.97 (±58.30)
S→R .702 (±.237) 4.629 (±.186) 12.62 (±41.91)
S→NEI .717 (±.161) 4.722 (±.152) 12.41 (±39.66)
R→S .778 (±.010) 4.814 (±.141) 11.93 (±37.04)
R→NEI .779 (±.009) 4.855 (±.098) 12.20 (±37.67)
NEI→R .780 (±.078) 4.894 (±.115) 15.27 (±111.2)
NEI→S .821 (±.008) 4.800 (±.085) 13.42 (±82.30)
Table 1: Universal Adversarial Trigger method perfor-
mance. Triggers are generated given claims from a
source class to fool the classifier to predict a target class
(column Class, with SUPPORTS (S), REFUTES (R),
NEI). The results are averaged over the top 10 triggers.
coherent. The macro F1 of the generative model
w.r.t. the intended label is 58.9 overall. For the
model without the STS objective, the macro F1 is
56.6, and for the model with the STS objective, it
is 60.7, meaning that using triggers found with the
STS objective helps the generated claims to retain
their intended label.
We measure the performance of the original FC
model on generated claims (Table 3). We compare
between using triggers that are generated with the
STS objective (Ex2) and without (Ex1). In both
cases, the adversarial claims effectively fool the FC
model, which performs 38.4% worse and 23.8%
worse on Ex1 and Ex2, respectively. Additionally,
the overall sentence quality increases when the trig-
gers are found with the STS objective (Ex2). The
FC model’s performance is higher on claims using
triggers generated with the STS objective but still
significantly worse than on the original claims. We
provide examples of generated claims with their
evidence in Table 2.
Comparing FC performance with our generated
claims vs. those from the development set of ad-
versarial claims from the FEVER shared task , we
see similar drops in performance (0.600 and 0.644
macro F1, respectively). While the adversarial trig-
gers from FEVER cause a larger performance drop,
Evidence Triggers Generated Claim
SUPPORTS Claims
Since the 19th century, some Romani have also
migrated to the Americas.
don,already,more,during,home Romani have moved to the Americas
during the 19th century.
Cyprus is a major tourist destination in the
Mediterranean.
foreign,biggest,major,every,
friends
Cyprus is a major tourist destination.
The first Nobel Prize in Chemistry was awarded
in 1901 to Jacobus Henricus van’t Hoff, of the
Netherlands, “for his discovery of the laws of
chemical dynamics and osmotic pressure in so-
lutions.”
later,already,quite,altern, whereas Henricus Van’t Hoff was already
awarded the Nobel Prize.
REFUTES Claims
California Attorney General Kamala Harris de-
feated Sanchez , 61.6% to 38.4%.
phys,incarn,not,occasionally,
something
Kamala Harris did not defeat
Sanchez, 61.6% to 38.4%.
Uganda is in the African Great Lakes region. unless,endorsed,picks,pref,
against
Uganda is against the African Great
Lakes region.
Times Higher Education World University Rank-
ings is an annual publication of university rank-
ings by Times Higher Education (THE) maga-
zine.
interested,reward,visit,
consumer,conclusion
Times Higher Education World Uni-
versity Rankings is a consumer mag-
azine.
NOT ENOUGH INFO Claims
The KGB was a military service and was gov-
erned by army laws and regulations, similar to
the Soviet Army or MVD Internal Troops.
nowhere,only,none,no,nothing The KGB was only controlled by a
military service.
The series revolves around Frank Castle, who
uses lethal methods to fight crime as the vigilante
“the Punisher”, with Jon Bernthal reprising the
role from Daredevil.
says,said,take,say,is Take Me High is about Frank Cas-
tle’s use of lethal techniques to fight
crime.
The Suite Life of Zack & Cody is an Amer-
ican sitcom created by Danny Kallis and Jim
Geoghan.
whilst,interest,applic,someone,
nevertheless
The Suite Life of Zack & Cody was
created by someone who never had
the chance to work in television.
Table 2: Examples of generated adversarial claims. These are all claims which the FC model incorrectly classified.
Target F1 Avg Quality # Examples
FC Objective
Overall 0.534 4.33 156
SUPPORTS 0.486 4.79 39
REFUTES 0.494 4.70 32
NEI 0.621 3.98 85
FC+STS Objectives
Overall 0.635 4.63 156
SUPPORTS 0.617 4.77 67
REFUTES 0.642 4.68 28
NEI 0.647 4.44 61
Table 3: FC performance for generated claims.
they were manually selected to meet the label co-
herence and grammatical correctness requirements.
Conversely, we automatically generate claims that
meet these requirements.
5 Conclusion
We present a method for automatically generating
highly potent, well-formed, label cohesive claims
for FC. We improve upon previous work on uni-
versal adversarial triggers by determining how to
construct valid claims containing a trigger word.
Our method is fully automatic, whereas previous
work on generating claims for fact checking is gen-
erally rule-based or requires manual intervention.
As FC is only one test bed for adversarial attacks,
it would be interesting to test this method on other
NLP tasks requiring semantic understanding such
as question answering to better understand short-
comings of models.
Acknowledgements
This project has received funding from
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research
and innovation programme under the Marie
Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 801199.
References
Liesbeth Allein, Isabelle Augenstein, and Marie-
Francine Moens. 2020. Time-Aware Evidence
Ranking for Fact-Checking. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2009.06402.
Pepa Atanasova, Alberto Barron-Cedeno, Tamer El-
sayed, Reem Suwaileh, Wajdi Zaghouani, Spas
Kyuchukov, Giovanni Da San Martino, and Preslav
Nakov. 2018. Overview of the CLEF-2018 Check-
That! Lab on Automatic Identification and Verifica-
tion of Political Claims. Task 1: Check-Worthiness.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.05542.
Isabelle Augenstein, Christina Lioma, Dongsheng
Wang, Lucas Chaves Lima, Casper Hansen, Chris-
tian Hansen, and Jakob Grue Simonsen. 2019. Mul-
tifc: A real-world multi-domain dataset for evidence-
based fact checking of claims. In EMNLP. Associa-
tion for Computational Linguistics.
Isabelle Augenstein, Tim Rockta¨schel, Andreas Vla-
chos, and Kalina Bontcheva. 2016. Stance Detec-
tion with Bidirectional Conditional Encoding. In
EMNLP, pages 876–885. The Association for Com-
putational Linguistics.
Ramy Baly, Mitra Mohtarami, James R. Glass, Llus
Mrquez, Alessandro Moschitti, and Preslav Nakov.
2018. Integrating Stance Detection and Fact Check-
ing in a Unified Corpus. In NAACL-HLT (2), pages
21–27. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Samuel R. Bowman, Gabor Angeli, Christopher Potts,
and Christopher D. Manning. 2015. A large anno-
tated corpus for learning natural language inference.
In Proceedings of the 2015 Conference on Empirical
Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP).
Association for Computational Linguistics.
Ousmane Amadou Dia, Elnaz Barshan, and Reza Ba-
banezhad. 2019. Semantics Preserving Adversarial
Learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.03905.
Javid Ebrahimi, Anyi Rao, Daniel Lowd, and Dejing
Dou. 2018. HotFlip: White-Box Adversarial Exam-
ples for Text Classification. In Proceedings of the
56th Annual Meeting of the Association for Compu-
tational Linguistics (Volume 2: Short Papers), pages
31–36.
Hang Gao and Tim Oates. 2019. Universal Adversarial
Perturbation for Text Classification. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1910.04618.
Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian
Szegedy. 2015. Explaining and Harnessing Adver-
sarial Examples. stat, 1050:20.
Casper Hansen, Christian Hansen, Stephen Alstrup,
Jakob Grue Simonsen, and Christina Lioma. 2019.
Neural Check-Worthiness Ranking With Weak Su-
pervision: Finding Sentences for Fact-Checking. In
Companion Proceedings of the 2019 World Wide
Web Conference, pages 994–1000.
Di Jin, Zhijing Jin, Joey Tianyi Zhou, and Peter
Szolovits. TextFool: Fool your Model with Natural
Adversarial Text.
Nitish Shirish Keskar, Bryan McCann, Lav R Varshney,
Caiming Xiong, and Richard Socher. 2019. Ctrl: A
conditional transformer language model for control-
lable generation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.05858.
Youngwoo Kim and James Allan. 2019. FEVER
breaker’s run of team NbAuzDrLqg. In Proceed-
ings of the Second Workshop on Fact Extraction and
VERification (FEVER), pages 99–104, Hong Kong,
China. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Yinhan Liu, Myle Ott, Naman Goyal, Jingfei Du, Man-
dar Joshi, Danqi Chen, Omer Levy, Mike Lewis,
Luke Zettlemoyer, and Veselin Stoyanov. 2019.
Roberta: A robustly optimized bert pretraining ap-
proach. arXiv preprint arXiv:1907.11692.
Christopher Malon. 2018. Team Papelo: Trans-
former Networks at FEVER. In Proceedings of the
First Workshop on Fact Extraction and VERification
(FEVER), pages 109–113.
Paul Michel, Xian Li, Graham Neubig, and
Juan Miguel Pino. 2019. On Evaluation of Ad-
versarial Perturbations for Sequence-to-Sequence
Models. In Proceedings of NAACL-HLT, pages
3103–3114.
Piotr Niewinski, Maria Pszona, and Maria Janicka.
2019. GEM: Generative enhanced model for adver-
sarial attacks. In Proceedings of the Second Work-
shop on Fact Extraction and VERification (FEVER),
pages 20–26, Hong Kong, China. Association for
Computational Linguistics.
Wojciech Ostrowski, Arnav Arora, Pepa Atanasova,
and Isabelle Augenstein. 2020. Multi-Hop Fact
Checking of Political Claims. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2009.06401.
Alec Radford, Jeffrey Wu, Rewon Child, David Luan,
Dario Amodei, and Ilya Sutskever. 2019. Language
models are unsupervised multitask learners. OpenAI
Blog, 1(8):9.
Shuhuai Ren, Yihe Deng, Kun He, and Wanxiang Che.
2019. Generating natural language adversarial ex-
amples through probability weighted word saliency.
In Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting of the
Association for Computational Linguistics, pages
1085–1097.
Marco Tulio Ribeiro, Sameer Singh, and Carlos
Guestrin. 2018. Semantically equivalent adversar-
ial rules for debugging nlp models. In Proceedings
of the 56th Annual Meeting of the Association for
Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers),
pages 856–865.
Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever,
Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and
Rob Fergus. 2013. Intriguing properties of neural
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199.
James Thorne, Andreas Vlachos, Christos
Christodoulopoulos, and Arpit Mittal. 2018.
FEVER: a Large-scale Dataset for Fact Extraction
and VERification. In Proceedings of the 2018
Conference of the North American Chapter of the
Association for Computational Linguistics: Human
Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long Papers),
pages 809–819.
James Thorne, Andreas Vlachos, Christos
Christodoulopoulos, and Arpit Mittal. 2019a.
Evaluating adversarial attacks against multiple
fact verification systems. In Proceedings of the
2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural
Language Processing and the 9th International
Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing
(EMNLP-IJCNLP), pages 2937–2946.
James Thorne, Andreas Vlachos, Oana Cocarascu,
Christos Christodoulopoulos, and Arpit Mittal.
2019b. The FEVER2.0 shared task. In Proceed-
ings of the Second Workshop on Fact Extraction
and VERification (FEVER), pages 1–6, Hong Kong,
China. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Eric Wallace, Shi Feng, Nikhil Kandpal, Matt Gard-
ner, and Sameer Singh. 2019. Universal Adversarial
Triggers for Attacking and Analyzing NLP. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Meth-
ods in Natural Language Processing and the 9th In-
ternational Joint Conference on Natural Language
Processing (EMNLP-IJCNLP), pages 2153–2162.
Thomas Wolf, Lysandre Debut, Victor Sanh, Julien
Chaumond, Clement Delangue, Anthony Moi, Pier-
ric Cistac, Tim Rault, R’emi Louf, Morgan Funtow-
icz, and Jamie Brew. 2019. Huggingface’s trans-
formers: State-of-the-art natural language process-
ing. ArXiv, abs/1910.03771.
Dustin Wright and Isabelle Augenstein. 2020. Claim
Check-Worthiness Detection as Positive Unlabelled
Learning. In Findings of EMNLP. Association for
Computational Linguistics.
Wenpeng Yin and Dan Roth. 2018. TwoWingOS:
A Two-Wing Optimization Strategy for Evidential
Claim Verification. In EMNLP, pages 105–114. As-
sociation for Computational Linguistics.
Wei Emma Zhang, Quan Z. Sheng, Ahoud Alhazmi,
and Chenliang Li. 2019. Adversarial Attacks on
Deep Learning Models in Natural Language Process-
ing: A Survey.
A Appendices
A.1 Implementation Details
Models. The RoBERTa FC model (125M parame-
ters) is fine-tuned with a batch size of 8, learning
rate of 2e-5 and for a total of 4 epochs, where the
epoch with the best performance is saved. We used
the implementation provided by HuggingFace li-
brary. We performed a grid hyper-parameter search
for the learning rate between the values 1e-5, 2e-5,
and 3e-5. The average time for training a model
with one set of hyperparameters is 155 minutes
(±3). The average accuracy over the different hy-
perparameter runs is 0.862(± 0.005) F1 score on
the validation set.
For the models that measure the perplexity and
the semantical similarity we use the pretrained
models provided by HuggingFace– RoBERTa large
model (125M parameters) fine tuned on the STS-b
task and RoBERTa base model (355M parameters)
pretrained on a LM objective.
We used the HuggingFace implementation of the
small GPT-2 model, which consists of 124,439,808
parameters and is fine-tuned with a batch size of 4,
learning rate of 3e-5, and for a total of 20 epochs.
We perform early stopping on the loss of the model
on a set of validation data. The average validation
loss is 0.910. The average runtime for training one
of the models is 31 hours and 28 minutes.
We note that, the intermediate models used in
this work and described in this section, are trained
on large relatively general-purpose datasets. While,
they can make some mistakes, they work well
enough and using them, we don’t have to rely on
additional human annotations for the intermediate
task.
Adversarial Triggers. The adversarial triggers
are generated based on instances from the valida-
tion set. We run the algorithm for three epochs to
allow for the adversarial triggers to converge. At
each epoch the initial trigger is updated with the
best performing trigger for the epoch (according to
the loss of the FC or FC+STS objective). At the
last step, we select only the top 10 triggers and re-
move any that have a negative loss. We choose the
top 10 triggers as those are the most potent ones,
adding more than top ten of the triggers preserves
the same tendencies in the results, but smooths
them as further down the list of adversarial attacks,
the triggers do not decrease the performance of the
model substantially. This is also supported by re-
lated literature (Wallace et al., 2019), where only
the top few triggers are selected.
The adversarial triggers method is run for 28.75
(± 1.47) minutes for with the FC objective and
168.6(± 28.44) minutes for the FC+STS objective.
We perform the trigger generation with a batch size
of four. We additionally normalize the loss for each
objective to be in the range [0,1] and also re-weight
the losses with a wieht of 0.6 for the FC loss and a
weight of 0.4 for the SST loss as when generated
with an equal weight, the SST loss tends to preserve
the same initial token in all epochs.
Datasets. The datasets used for training the FC
model consist of 161,249 SUPPORTS, 60,227 RE-
FUTES, and 69,885 NEI claims for the training
split; 6,207 SUPPORTS, 6,235 REFUTES, and
6,554 NEI claims for the dev set; 6,291 SUP-
PORTS, 5,992 REFUTES, and 6522 NEI claims.
The evidence for each claim is the gold evidence
provided from the FEVER dataset, which is avail-
able for REFUTES and SUPPORTS claims. When
there is more than one annotation of different evi-
dence sentences for an instance, we include them as
separate instances in the datasets. For NEI claims,
we use the system of Malon (2018) to retrieve evi-
dence sentences.
A.2 Top Adversarial Triggers
Table 4 presents the top adversarial triggers for
each direction found with the Universal Adversarial
Triggers method. It offers an additional way of
estimating the effectiveness of the STS objective by
comparing the number of negation words generated
by the basic model (8) and the STS objective (2) in
the top-3 triggers for each direction.
B Supplemental Material
B.1 Computing Infrastructure
All experiments were run on a shared cluster. Re-
quested jobs consisted of 16GB of RAM and 4 Intel
Xeon Silver 4110 CPUs. We used two NVIDIA
Titan RTX GPUs with 12GB of RAM for training
GPT-2 and one NVIDIA Titan X GPU with 8GB
of RAM for training the FC models and finding the
universal adversarial triggers.
B.2 Evaluation Metrics
The primary evaluation metric used was macro-F1
score. We used the sklearn implementation
of precision recall fscore support,
which can be found here: https://scikit-learn.
org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.
metrics.precision_recall_fscore_support.
html. Briefly:
p =
tp
tp+ fp
r =
tp
tp+ fn
F1 =
2 ∗ p ∗ r
p+ r
where tp are true positives, fp are false positives,
and fn are false negatives.
B.3 Manual Evaluation
After generating the claims, two independent an-
notators label the overall claim quality (score of
1-5) and the true label for the claim. The inter-
annotator agreement for the quality label using
Krippendorff’s alpha is 0.54 for the quality score
and 0.38 for the claim label. Given this, we take
the average of the two annotator’s scores for the
final quality score and have a third expert annotator
examine and select the best label for each contested
claim label.
Class Trigger F1 STS PPL
FC Objective
S→R only 0.014 4.628 11.660 (36.191)
S→R nothing 0.017 4.286 13.109 (56.882)
S→R nobody 0.036 4.167 12.784 (37.390)
S→NEI neither 0.047 3.901 11.509 (31.413)
S→NEI none 0.071 4.016 13.136 (39.894)
S→NEI Neither 0.155 3.641 11.957 (44.274)
R→S some 0.687 4.694 11.902 (33.348)
R→S Sometimes 0.724 4.785 10.813 (32.058)
R→S Some 0.743 4.713 11.477 (37.243)
R→NEI recommended 0.658 4.944 12.658 (36.658)
R→NEI Recommend 0.686 4.789 10.854 (32.432)
R→NEI Supported 0.710 4.739 11.972 (40.267)
NEI→R Only 0.624 4.668 12.939 (57.666)
NEI→R nothing 0.638 4.476 11.481 (48.781)
NEI→R nobody 0.678 4.361 16.345 (111.60)
NEI→S nothing 0.638 4.476 18.070 (181.85)
NEI→S existed 0.800 4.950 15.552 (79.823)
NEI→S area 0.808 4.834 13.857 (93.295)
FC+STS Objectives
S→R never 0.048 4.267 12.745 (50.272)
S→R every 0.637 4.612 13.714 (51.244)
S→R didn 0.719 4.986 12.416 (41.080)
S→NEI always 0.299 4.774 11.906 (35.686)
S→NEI every 0.637 4.612 12.222 (38.440)
S→NEI investors 0.696 4.920 12.920 (42.567)
R→S over 0.761 4.741 12.139 (33.611)
R→S about 0.765 4.826 12.052 (37.677)
R→S her 0.774 4.513 12.624 (41.350)
R→NEI top 0.757 4.762 12.787 (39.418)
R→NEI also 0.770 5.034 11.751 (35.670)
R→NEI when 0.776 4.843 12.444 (37.658)
NEI→R only 0.562 4.677 14.372 (83.059)
NEI→R there 0.764 4.846 11.574 (42.949)
NEI→R just 0.786 4.916 16.879 (135.73)
NEI→S of 0.802 4.917 11.844 (55.871)
NEI→S is 0.815 4.931 17.507 (178.55)
NEI→S A 0.818 4.897 12.526 (67.880)
Table 4: Top-3 triggers found with the Universal Adversarial Triggers methods. The triggers are generated given
claims from a source class (column Class), so that the classifier is fooled to predict a different target class. The
classes are SUPPORTS (S), REFUTES (R), NOT ENOUGH INFO (NEI).
